Peace talks: indexical master tropes and their potential for conflict in the construction of national identity by Stefanescu, Bogdan
www.ssoar.info
Peace talks: indexical master tropes and their
potential for conflict in the construction of national
identity
Stefanescu, Bogdan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Stefanescu, B. (2017). Peace talks: indexical master tropes and their potential for conflict in the construction of national
identity. ESSACHESS - Journal for Communication Studies, 10(1), 11-31. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-52913-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0
ESSACHESS. Journal for Communication Studies, vol. 10, no. 1(19) / 2017: 11-31 
eISSN 1775-352X             © ESSACHESS 
Peace talks: indexical master tropes and their potential for 
conflict in the construction of national identity 
Professor Bogdan STEFANESCU 
University of Bucharest 
ROMANIA 
bogdan.stefanescu@lls.unibuc.ro 
Abstract: This paper employs discursive constructivism to delineate four rhetorical 
paradigms of nationalist discourse and to compare their potential for conflict. It 
proposes a four-fold typology which sees the intuitive tropes of antithesis and simi-
le, and the counterintuitive metaphor and irony as structuring principles for national 
self-images. These are four modes of constructing a cultural deixis, that is, a rela-
tionship between national self and its cultural other. The paper argues that the fre-
quency and magnitude of nationalistic conflicts may be minimized by the steady and 
widespread counter-enculturation of the non-conflictual discourses of analogical 
(simile-based), metaphoric, and ironic nationalisms. This argument is illustrated 
with examples from modern and recent Romanian history, but may be taken to epit-
omize the condition of most postcommunist European nations. 
Keywords: nationalist discourse, national identity, master tropes, conflict analysis, 
cultural deixis 
*** 
Pourparlers pour la paix: des tropes principaux indexicaux et leur potentiel de 
conflit dans la construction de l'identité nationale 
Résumé: Cet article utilise le constructivisme discursif pour présenter quatre para-
digmes du discours nationaliste et comparer leurs potentialités respectives à générer 
des conflits. Il propose une typologie quadruple qui  considère les tropes intuitifs de 
l'antithèse et de la comparaison et ceux contraires à l'intuition de la métaphore et de 
l'ironie comme principes structuraux de l'image de soi-même nationale. Il s'agit donc 
de quatre modalités de construire une déixis culturelle, c'est-à-dire une relation entre 
l'être national et l'autre culturel. L'article soutient que la fréquence et la magnitude 
des conflits nationalistes peuvent être diminuées par la contre-enculturation des 
discours non-conflictuels des nationalismes analogique (fondé sur des comparai-
sons), métaphorique et ironique. La démonstration est basée sur des exemples qui 
sont empruntés à l'histoire moderne et récente de la Roumanie, mais peuvent être 
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considérés représentatifs pour la situation de la majorité des nations postcommu-
nistes de l'Europe.  
Mots-clés: discours nationaliste, identité nationale, tropes principaux, analyse du 
conflit, déixis culturelle 
*** 
Nationalism is often construed as a unidimensional ideology (or even social pa-
thology) which is responsible for ethnic and racial violence (see, for instance, Danilo 
Kiš’s “On Nationalism” or Tom Nairn’s The Break-up of Britain). The view is 
broadly embraced but it really comes from confusing nationalism with xenophobia, 
racism, jingoism, chauvinism, or populism. At best, nationalism is only deemed 
acceptable in its “good” variety (Western and liberal or civic), unlike the “bad” sort, 
which is ethnic or racial and which comes from the East (including Eastern Europe). 
This paper disputes such opinions and instead takes nationalism to be a consistent 
and legitimate endeavor to construct collective self-images by means of various 
structuring discursive mechanisms. I am calling these mechanisms “indexical master 
tropes”, as they position the subject in a world of national groups and shape relation-
ships between the national self and its cultural others. As such, nationalism becomes 
not only acceptable, but also diversified, as each of its constitutive rhetorical para-
digms displays a different attitude towards cultural alterity and a varying potential 
for conflict. 
The methodology with which I am working here is a variant of the discursive 
constructivism to be found in Edward Said, Benedict Anderson, and Homi Bhabha 
(Ștefănescu, 2016, p. 91-104 and 2013a, p. 90-8, 160-2). This means that I take 
nations and national identities to be discursive representations (Michael Billig, 1995, 
p. 8-10, 60-92, Stuart Hall, 1996, p. 612-3, Craig Calhoun, 1997, p. 22, and Uzun
Özkirimli, 2000, p. 229-232) rather than the mechanical result of historical contexts 
or social instruments as in objective constructivist theories.1 I will categorize the
complex array of structuring rhetorical acts of nation-building into four discursive 
paradigms, and will compare their various potentials for predisposing subjects to 
non/conflictual attitudes.  
My approach starts from the theory of “master tropes” provided by Kenneth 
Burke in A Grammar of Motives. Hayden White has defined them as “the dominant 
modes of discourse which penetrate to that level of consciousness on which a world 
of experience is constituted prior to being analysed” (1973, p. xi, 33). The notion 
1 In contextualist explanations, nations occur wherever there is a modern state and significant urbaniza-
tion (Hans Kohn and George Schöpflin), a standardized, centralized culture as a result of economic, 
political, and social development (Ernest Gellner),  a social milieu where certain classes and regions are 
predominant (Peter Sugar), or recruitment campaigns and migration towards the cities (Eugene Weber). 
Instrumentalists pin nations down to state institutions (Anthony Giddens and Charles Tilly), means of 
mass communication (Karl Deutsch, Louis L. Snyder, and Benedict Anderson), the public education 
system (Snyder, Carlton Hayes, Eugene Weber, and Eric Hobsbawm), or mass printing industry (Hayes 
and Anderson).   
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that such basic rhetorical devices structure our representations of reality indicates a 
“cultural deixis”, an infrequent term (and one that usually lacks an explicit defini-
tion) for the complex processes of positioning oneself as to culturally-defined in-
groups and out-groups, of acquiring a sense of place and time for one’s community, 
or of understanding the particularities of one’s community by comparison with oth-
ers. Cultural deixis is rhetorically inflected and these inflections result in competing 
versions of the national self-image. They are deictic modulations which occur on the 
basis of alternative generative patterns, the indexical master tropes. Indexical master 
tropes could be described as deep structuring processes that configure our represen-
tations of the collective self and of its cultural other(s). In the case of marginalized 
countries like Romania, which have been subjected to a damaging process of other-
ing by both the Western and the Soviet gaze, the various deictic schemata are meant 
to comfort the hurt national ego and flex nationalistic muscles. After the fall of 
communism, the country was once again free to revisit the alternative and compet-
ing genealogies of nationalism in order to restore its damaged identity. In the pro-
cess of exemplifying such first aid maneuvers, I will try to demonstrate that cultural 
deixis is more complicated than the orthodox linguistic models of indexicality and 
that cultural trauma complicates it even more. 
Traditionally, deixis is described by means of ”egocentric particulars” (Bertrand 
Russell). These are indicators of the special character or position of the speaker and 
of the speaking situation (Ruthrof, 2009, p. 22). All utterances are commonly be-
lieved to naturally place the speaking subjects at the center or inner circle of their 
here-and-now universe, looking out at other persons or other spaces and times. The-
se egocentric and naturalistic assumptions have been questioned by William F. 
Hanks (1990) and proven particularly inadequate especially for understanding (post-
traumatic) cultural deixis, which is neither entirely “ego-”, nor “-centric”. Hanks 
proposes that deixis is culturally constructed, that it is based on a dialogic interaction 
of more than the speaker’s singular viewpoint, and that this interaction between 
several perspectives is loaded as a result of an asymmetric distribution of “cultural 
capital” between them (1990, p. 7, 15 and passim). Mihaela Irimia is similarly so-
phisticated in describing the complications of this “axiologically loaded” process: 
Encountering the Other [is] an eye-opening experience producing an in-
creased awareness of doubleness in oneself. . . . Cultural deixis, if properly 
nuanced, can teach us the “here” and the “there”, can become interchangea-
ble from where we are, as can the “I” and the “you” involved in cultural as-
sessments. It is this dynamics that turns nature into nurture and provides us 
with the food of cultural identity. (2012, p. 32, 39) 
I embrace the problematization of cultural deixis undertaken by Hanks and 
Irimia and in the remainder of my paper I will illustrate such complications in the 
context of marginalized nations like Romania. These countries have been attempting 
to reconstruct their cultural self under symbolic duress by employing the rhetorical 
schemata of indexical master tropes in order to reposition themselves in relation to 
cultural others. 
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1. Antagonistic indexicality. Imagining the nation by antithesis
Though the Burke-White model of tropical representations of reality is extremely 
useful, I find that the particular tropes with which they work are only partly ade-
quate to describe the mechanics of national identity construction. Consequently, I 
am proposing an alternative four-fold typology of indexical master tropes, which 
preserves metaphor and irony, but replaces metonymy and synecdoche with antithe-
sis and simile.  
In fact, I am proposing that antithesis and simile are the most frequent indexical 
master tropes for the nationalist imagination, as they are more intuitive and closer to 
our experiential perceptions (Ștefănescu, 2013a, p. 170-9 and 2016, p. 107-22). This 
is also François Hartog’s observation when he talks of inversion and analogy as the 
major “figures” or “schemata” in the discursive construction of self/other images by 
Herodotus (1988, p. 210 and passim). I think Hartog’s observations have universal 
currency and their applicability goes beyond the study of antiquity. For instance, 
historian Lucian Boia also claims that, in their recent past, as a result of having been 
disparagingly othered by the West (and, I would add, also forcibly assimilated by 
Soviet communism), Romanians could not help but react to these cultural injuries in 
one of two ways: either by an autochthonist inflation of their irreducible difference 
or by a desperate show of sameness with the rest of Europe, through which they 
hoped to demonstrate that they share the continent’s cultural values, ideas, and tradi-
tions (Boia, 2000, p. 281).  
Antithesis, or the “juxtaposition of contrasting words or ideas” (apud Howard, 
2010, p. 39), is a product of the antagonistic imagination and seems to be the most 
conflictual indexical master trope—and the most common. Echoing Andrew 
Linklater (The Transformation of Political Community), Vivienne Jabri finds that 
“[w]hat we witness today is the prevalence of war and the politics of antagonism” 
(2007, p. 7; cf. also 1996, p. 120 and passim) in international politics. Antithesis 
describes the national self as contrary to a designated cultural other—an inversion in 
Hartog’s imagological lexicon—and magnifies the differences between one’s own 
and other nations. This was explained by social psychologists as “ingroup-
favouring”, a self-categorization through the maximization of differences from out-
groups (Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). This observation was phrased in his inimitably ironic 
way by Hungarian-British author George Mikes: 
…in England everything is the other way round. On Sundays on the Conti-
nent even the poorest person puts on his best suit, tries to look respectable, 
and at the same time the life of the country becomes gay and cheerful; in 
England even the richest peer or motor-manufacturer dresses in some pecu-
liar rags, does not shave, and the country becomes dull and dreary. On the 
Continent there is one topic which should be avoided - the weather; in Eng-
land, if you do not repeat the phrase 'Lovely day, isn't it?' at least two hun-
dred times a day, you are considered a bit dull.. . . On the Continent almost 
every nation whether little or great has openly declared at one time or an-
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other that it is superior to all other nations; the English fight heroic wars to 
combat these dangerous ideas without ever mentioning which is really the 
most superior race in the world. . . . Many continentals think life is a game; 
the English think cricket is a game. (1946) 
Antithesis, then, works through opposition between the national self and its ad-
versarial other. It operates hyperbolic augmentations and reductions of the compared 
groups making them look either exceptionally good or exceptionally bad, and disre-
garding anything they might hold in common. The rhetorical function of antithetical 
nationalism is to mobilize the nation, to move it (movere) to react against inferior or 
dangerous cultural alterities by means of passionate appeals (pathos) and tragic-
heroic action-driven stories (Ștefănescu, 2013c, p. 130-3, 161).  
The use of antithesis has a lengthy tradition in Romanian culture as well. But it 
was especially in the nineteenth century, as Romania was fighting for political union 
and independence from foreign oppression, that the radical (often reactionary) au-
tochthonism of cultural personalities like Mihai Eminescu, Bogdan Petriceicu 
Hasdeu, or Nicolae Bălcescu became dominant and it was canonized in the first half 
of the twentieth century (Boia, 2000, p. 65 and passim). In its early days, after 
WWII, Soviet-imposed communism briefly interrupted the antithetical nationalist 
tradition. In the new reigning ideology, class rather than ethnicity was the only ac-
cepted criterion for radical exclusionism. As a result, historical personalities in Ro-
mania’s revised hall of nationalist fame were included or removed depending on 
their attitude toward the exploited classes—and the Russians (Boia, 2000, p. 215). 
But as Romania started pulling away from Moscow’s hegemony after the withdraw-
al of the Red Army in 1958, the old antagonistic scheme of national identification by 
antithetical inversion was recycled by national-communist propaganda. Domestic 
communist leaders set the pace for a renewed nationalist discourse which rediscov-
ered Bălcescu and Eminescu and reinscribed ethnicity as a validating criterion (Boia, 
2000, p. 218 and passim). Official propagandists and historians, literary mercenaries 
like those grouped around the weekly magazine Săptămîna, the “protochronists”, 
that is, the cultural elites that were sanctioned by the communist power, all joined in 
overstating the inherent antagonism of such national self-images through a discourse 
of ethnic hatred and exclusion. 
Sailing serenely across different historical contexts, antithetic nationalism was 
then rediscovered in Romania after 1989 as a reaction to the nation’s precipitated 
efforts to be assimilated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Early in the 1990s, former 
communist apparatchiks and secret police officers rode that wave by infiltrating 
political and civic organizations like Vatra românească, Greater Romania, and the 
National Salvation Front and by rejuvenating the traditional exclusionary tactics of 
extremist national assertion. This fostered a series of fierce controversies such as the 
“alternative history textbooks scandal” (Boia, 2000, p. 19-24), the polemic occa-
sioned by an issue of the Dilema (no. 265 of 1998) cultural weekly which was di-
rected against the quasi-religious cult of the “national poet” Eminescu, the debate 
over the condemnation of the Gândirea interwar personalities for anti-Semitism and 
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fascist sympathies, etc. Like most of the other postcommunist nations, post-1989 
Romanians were eager to retrace their confiscated traditions and reconsider their 
national destiny. This new moment of national reconstruction mostly replicated the 
older pre- and interwar debates on the making of modern Romania together with the 
attending radical over-simplifications (Ornea, 1980, p. 307 and passim, Hitchins, 
1994, p. 55 and passim). The usual quarrel between the traditionalists and the West-
ernizers was repeatedly revisited. The polemic in the leading cultural magazines 
Revista 22, Dilema, and Contrapunct between Westernizer Gabriel Andreescu and 
anti-Westernizer Octavian Paler, who was joined by the more moderate Alexandru 
Paleologu (cf. Andreescu 1996), epitomizes this reductive antagonism. While An-
dreescu addresses the problem of Moldova and Transylvania in clearly liberal insti-
tutionalist fashion and repudiates the ethno-culturalist positions (1996, p. 20-21 and 
passim), Paler invokes a war between nationalists and the “Europeans” and de-
scribes the latter as “servile” to the West since they “understand perfectly what is 
going on in Strasbourg, but are incapable of seeing what is going on in Romania” 
(qtd. in Andreescu, 1996, p. 38). Later, as Romania joined its ranks, the European 
Union itself came to be presented as an alien colonial antagonist by members of the 
political and intellectual elites, on a par with Soviet communism (Ștefănescu, 2014, 
p. 363).
Complications. When Lucian Boia (2000, p. 257) proposes his mutual dependen-
cy theory whereby Romanian historiography operated under the compulsion to 
merely oppose Hungarian accounts of the region’s past  it becomes clear that even 
the simplistic oppositions of antithetical nationalist discourse raise some problems. 
In his imagological analysis, François Hartog describes inversion (“anti-sameness”) 
as a process of cultural representation by which the other is really translated into the 
same, except that it is now reversed: “it is no longer a matter of a and b, simply of a 
and the converse of a”. Hartog sees it as a “heuristic principle” whereby an other-
wise opaque difference is translated into a mere reversal of the familiar terms in 
which the cultural self is imagined (1988, p. 213-4). It appears, then, that self and 
other are locked in this confrontation which turns their conflict zone into a common 
ground and makes them dependent on one another. Indeed, certain rhetorical defini-
tions of antithesis already suggest the insidious presence of similarity and parallel-
ism at the heart of oppositions (Baldick, 2001, p. 14), which makes possible the 
mutual dependency of cultural opposites.  
Reversed exceptionalism is another complication in the antithetical self-imaging 
of traumatized cultures. Usually, antithetical nationalism presents the collective self 
as superior to its cultural other, but distressed cultural identities often display a self-
loathing complex. As a result, one’s own nation is viewed in disparaging terms and 
turned into an exemplary victim. The identitarian anxiety of inter-war Romanian 
writers like Tristan Tzara, Eugen Ionescu, or Emil Cioran was so dire that they di-
rected their sarcasm against their own culture in a twisted effort to singularize their 
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nation through its defects.2 During communism, a similar feeling of guilt and shame
led to a wave of self-disparaging jokes. One such joke proclaimed: “Romania is the 
most beautiful country in the world—too bad it had to be populated by the Romani-
ans. . .” This is no more than a cloaked or reversed exceptionalism: the nation is still 
perceived as exceptional, but in a negative way. It is an indication of hurt national 
pride and a tragic attempt at a twisted form of self-assertion. Even after the fall of 
communism, the self-loathing was still there. Echoing Cioran, Horia-Roman 
Patapievici, one of the most spectacular literary debutants in the early 1990s, derided 
the exceptionalist odes to Romanian heritage. Interestingly, though, in his sarcasm 
Patapievici employs precisely the rhetorical tactics of antithetical nationalism in 
order to replace positive with negative exceptionalism:  
To be a Romanian did not pose for me any problem of choice: it was an 
ineluctable destiny. A dilect one, no doubt, for the optimistic, flattering on-
tology edified by Mircea Vulcănescu and Constantin Noica... seemed to 
create a right. Romanianness, therefore, was instituted as a kind of privi-
lege, a kind of baptism through birth, even preceding birth. To be a Roma-
nian meant to be chosen. No doubt, you have been able to recognize this as 
the ethnic theory of the stamped spermatozoon. (1995, p. 84) 
2. Analogical Indexicality. Imagining the Nation by Simile
Although conflictual antithetical representations seem like the most popular 
choice for all nationalist discourse, it must be noted that there are three other tropical 
moves to construct national identity which appear to be less or even entirely non-
adversarial. One such indexical master trope that represents the self-other relation-
ship in a non-conflictual manner is grounded in sameness. Simile, a product of the 
analogical imagination, has traditionally constituted the alternative rhetorical strate-
gy to antithetical identification. Analogy was, alongside inversion, a major 
imagological device since ancient Greek historiography according to François Har-
tog (1988, p. 212-30). Representing self and other through similarities, rather than 
irreconcilable differences, analogical nationalism employs our reasonability—
whether we resort to Aristotelian logos or to Habermasian communicative rationality 
(Habermas 1998)—in order to develop a sense of compatibility with the other(s) and 
a common ground that facilitates cohabitation and negotiated solutions. Antithetical 
and analogical nationalists may be said to illustrate the opposing categories of 
“sharpeners” and “levelers” in the cognitive typology of G. S. Klein or those of 
“field-dependence” and “field-independence” in H. A. Witkin’s taxonomy (Ko-
2 Before leaving Romania for good, Eugen Ionescu wrote a devastating pamphlet againt domestic culture
called No. Tristan Tzara, the notorious pen-name taken by Jewish-Romanian avant-gardist Samuel Ro-
senstock was a transliteration of the Romanian phrase trist în ţară ("sad in [my] country"). While still in 
Romania, Emil Cioran published two volumes of vituperations against his own country: On the Heights of 
Despair (Pe culmile disperării, 1934) and Romania's Transfiguration (Schimbarea la faţă a României, 
1939). 
18    Bogdan STEFANESCU  Peace talks: indexical master tropes… 
zhevnikov, 2007, p. 465 and passim). Critical discourse analysts also speak of two 
alternative manners of constructing national identity through “assimilation” and 
“dissimilation” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, 2009, p. 33 and passim). The 
rhetorical function of analogical nationalism is to enlighten and emancipate the 
nation (docere), to instill reasonability towards cultural alterity, and to create a sense 
of broad homogeneity (universalism). It usually employs rational appeals to order 
and consensus (logos) which it illustrated by inductive examples and moralizing 
fables (Ștefănescu, 2013c, p. 123-30, 161-2). 
Using simile to create an analogical relationship between national self and cul-
tural other that focuses on sameness is a particularly handy device for the nationalist 
discourse of subaltern cultures attempting to convince the (Western) world of their 
legitimacy as independent and equal nations.3 From 1780 to the revolutionary 1840s
and later in the century, the virulent adversarial romantic images of the Romanian 
nation were complemented by a liberal and civic nationalism fed by Enlightenment 
universalism (Borbély, 2008). In the twentieth century, literary personality Eugen 
Lovinescu was an exemplary analogic nationalist. In his History of Modern Romani-
an Civilization (1924-1926) Lovinescu proposes the theory of “synchronism”, an 
elaboration on the mechanics of simile according to which the mere imitation of 
Western civilization would bring uniformity and create a viable society in Romania. 
Lovinescu is but one of several liberal-minded intellectuals in interwar Romania, 
such as Ion G. Duca, Ștefan Zeletin or Camil Petrescu, who were all driven to uni-
versalism by their analogical imagination. 
Romanian communism tried to destroy the tradition and continuity of liberal na-
tionalist thought. As it turned from its early internationalist jargon to national-
communism, the self-imaging process dictated by communist propaganda incorpo-
rated the radical antagonistic vision of interwar antithetic nationalism. The decades 
of indoctrination made it difficult for more liberal variants of nationalism to 
reemerge in the public space after the fall of communism. There have been, howev-
er, a few if unrelated voices like those of anti-communist dissident Gabriel An-
dreescu, the stay-behind literary theorist Adrian Marino, self-exiled cultural histori-
an Virgil Nemoianu, or the younger politologist-turned-politican Cristian Preda who 
promoted simile-based reconstructions of a liberal nation through the emulation of 
Western models.  
Complications. In traumatized cultures such as the Romanian, simile is by its na-
ture inseparable from dissimilarity. As a literary/rhetorical device it is generally 
described as “an explicit comparison between two different things, actions, or feel-
ings, using the words 'as' or 'like'” (Baldick, 2001, p. 237). In fact, it can be argued 
that simile is only possible because the objects compared are different and that, in 
3 In its Proclamation of Independence, the Greek National Assembly of 1822 justified its nationalist war
against the Ottoman oppressor by an appeal to the “rights which the civilized people of Europe, our 
neighbors, enjoy today” and by the desire “to assimilate ourselves to the rest of the Christians in Europe, 
our brethren” (Kohn, 1955, p. 116-7). 
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spite of its effort to dissipate or hide the disparity, simile reinforces it. Let us re-
member that Hartog declares analogical collective image construction to be a mech-
anism whose purpose is to negotiate discrepancy and make otherness more accessi-
ble to our understanding.  
With a historically traumatized nation like Romania, it is only because the na-
tional self was constantly othered by the West that it desperately needs to present 
itself as not unlike that of occidental nations (Boia, 2000, p. 281). And yet, although 
it is presumed to be the same, there is an obvious asymmetry of sameness in the 
discourse situation: the Western listener still has to be persuaded that the two cul-
tures are the same against a habitus wherein the Eastern speaker’s culture is com-
monly perceived as inferior. Western modernity has been constructed, among other 
things, through the relegation of East European cultures to a primitive and underde-
veloped status (cf. Larry Wolff, 1994 and Maria Todorova, 1997). Such cultures 
were gradually made to internalize that perception and were consequently doomed to 
picture themselves from an alter-centric perspective, rather than an ego-centric one, 
in an endless process of mimicking the West. Postcommunist countries are pushed 
into a mimicry of the Western stance with the perpetual awareness that they are just 
that, sham replicas of an original (a deictic origo) that lies elsewhere.  
As a result, Romania’s liberal-analogical nationalism acquires a particular flavor. 
In subaltern and marginalized cultures, the claims to sameness and kinship come 
from a defensive attitude against inimical aliens, which changes dramatically the 
nature and function of liberal discourses. Alexandru George argues that Romanian 
attempts at Western models of liberalism are typical of oppressed and “proletarian” 
peoples like the Italian, the Poles, the Hungarians, the Greeks, the Jews, the Serbs, 
the Bulgarians etc. In the “classical” countries which experienced incipient liberal-
ism, the movement had no national connotation, it was entirely “vertical” (class 
conscious, let us call it), whereas in these other parts of the world revolutionarism 
was mostly “horizontal”, it mobilized all social layers to fight against the foreigners 
and achieve national definition (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1998, p. 47). In such contexts, 
then, analogical liberalism was not so much adopted as adapted, transfigured, and 
made to serve different purposes through a process of Calibanization.  
The garden varieties of nationalist rhetoric, based on antithesis and simile, are 
not as straightforward as they may seem in the case of traumatized cultures. Antithe-
sis clamors difference just as it ushers similarity, while simile protests a sameness 
that is forever deferred by the very othering which made simile a necessary rhetori-
cal strategy in the first place. The twin practices of exceptionalism and mimicry 
complicate identity-formation practices by operating simultaneously on sameness 
and difference and by setting up a perplexing relationship between self and other in 
traumatized cultures.  
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3. Harmonious Indexicality. Imagining the Nation by Metaphor
The forging of national images of such cultures is tortuous not only as a result of 
the complications of the seemingly simple rhetorical schemata of antithesis and 
simile, but also because of the co-presence of two other indexical master tropes, 
which are overtly complicated and whose logic is counter-intuitive: metaphor and 
irony. Metaphor performs an impenetrable symbolic function that Blake once called 
“double vision”. It prefigures the quintessential and harmonious unity of self and 
other—as of most opposites we can think of—before they are even separated in our 
mind. Because of the counter-intuitive and counter-experiential nature of metaphoric 
representations, the true nature of metaphor has constantly been misrepresented 
since Aristotle, the originator of the thesis according to which a metaphor is merely 
a clipped simile (Rhetoric III, 1406b). Romantic theories of symbol and metaphor 
have attempted to change the old Aristotelian understanding of metaphor, yet the bi-
millenary resilience of this misrepresentation of metaphor in the community of phi-
losophers and scientists (even linguists like R. Jakobson) is nothing short of 
astounding. Even when they propose more complicated explanatory schemes like 
possible worlds semantics, analysts keep conflating metaphor and simile (cf. Hin-
tikka & Sandu, 1994, p. 156-60 and passim).  
Luckily, literary scholars are trained to spot the obvious differences between a 
simile and a genuine, live metaphor. Frank Kermode’s famous study of the “roman-
tic image” points to its essentially metaphoric attributes: isolation and autonomous 
individuality, as well as an irrational monism by virtue of which motif and expres-
sion, matter and form, body and soul become indistinguishable from one another 
(1961, p. 21, 43-8). With similar acumen, Christine Brooke-Rose has described 
metaphor as a union of two different things: 
The comparison merely states that A is like B, never that A is B. In meta-
phor B can replace A altogether, leaving us to guess it, or it can be linked to 
A by an enormous variety of complex grammatical and syntactical means 
of expression. . . . Metaphor, in this study, is any replacement of one word 
by another, or any identification of one thing, concept or person with any 
other. (1958,  p. 9, 14, 23-4) 
Likewise, Northrop Frye sees (ecstatic) metaphor as a mode of representation 
that arises from a special existential mode wherein self and other become identical: 
…in a state of society in which a split between a perceiving subject and a
perceived object is not yet habitual, and what it does in that context is to 
open up a channel or current of energy between human and natural worlds. . 
. . The essential point here is that literary metaphor, which is purely hypo-
thetical, grows out of an existential type of metaphor, as we might call it, 
where a subject does identify himself with something not himself, in an ex-
perience which has no further need for language. . . . (1990, p. 111, 118, 
226) 
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In his turn, Paul de Man points at the consubstantiality of manner and substance 
in the metaphoric, fragmentary structure of the Romantic idiom and he insists that 
metaphor expresses one single experience, rather than link two separate experiences 
as does analogy (1984, p. 4). 
Symbolic imagination employs the master trope of metaphor in order to create 
images of the nation which focus on its detached phenomenological identity. This 
indexical mechanism represents self and other as indistinguishable in a counter-
intuitive relation which might be called identity-as-oneness. The rhetorical function 
of metaphoric nationalism is to invite the listener to join the speaker in an identifica-
tion with the intuitive essence of the nation, to share the pleasure (delectare) of 
harmonious oneness which is at once private and communal, to become oblivious of 
differences and strife, and to conflate national self and cultural other by means of 
mellow empathetic appeals (Quintilian’s gentler and conciliatory ethos in Institutes 
of Oratory VI.2.9-19), epideictic tributes, and idyllic/lyrical textual modalities 
(Ștefănescu, 2013c, p. 133-8, 160-1). Metaphoric nationalist discourse seeks harmo-
nious oneness not only among the elements that compose the nation, but also be-
tween the nation and the world at large in a universe where difference and alterity 
have all but ceased being represented to the mind. 
Obscuring cultural difference and opposition through metaphoric oblivion is a 
rhetorical strategy whereby a traumatized Romanian identity can find solace in an 
imaginary universe devoid of strife and free from the confrontation with inimical 
others. Geographer George Vâlsan provides a telling example of this defensive 
mechanism for representing the nation. In 1919, a year after Romania finally became 
reunited with Transylvania, in his inaugural open lecture on geography at the recent-
ly Romanianized University of Cluj, Vâlsan posits an ancestral "sense of place" that 
precedes and molds the concept of fatherland. He illustrates this with moşie, a word 
derived from moş, meaning "old man", "grandfather" or "forefather" and designating 
a traditionally inherited land: 
The Romanian does not say: 'I fight for my people', he says: 'I fight for my 
country, for my moşie. And wisely so, for he does not fight simply for this 
great agglomeration of contemporaries, but also for his land, - this land that 
our peasant cherishes so, - and for his forefathers [moşi] which this land 
preserves. What a fine word moşie! Evidently it comes from moși, but it 
still refers to land. It joins these elements into one.. . . And it is so right that 
the notion of land in its diverse geographic fashions should be part of the 
obscure national conscience of the peasant!. . . Nature is endowed with a 
soul, and that soul is ours. (Chimet, 1992, p. 29) 
Vâlsan takes metaphoric perception to conflate several distinctions into this pan-
harmonious word, moşie. His chosen metaphor harmonizes-into-one the land and its 
people, private property and common territory, nature and consciousness, the uni-
versal soul and the Romanian soul.  
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The interbellum was an age of cultural wars over the nature and the territory of 
the nation, which had doubled as a result of the 1918 Union, scandalizing the con-
tending neighbors. Against their accusations, some Romanian nationalists found 
rhetorical shelter in the safe universe provided by isolated words or syntagms. Phi-
losopher and poet Lucian Blaga believed this to be an echo of the millennial survival 
skills developed by Romanians—a strategic retreat from the open planes into the 
mountainous forests paired with a withdrawal from or “boycott” of, history 
(Ștefănescu, 2015, p. 114). In his 1936 philosophical essay, Spațiul mioritic, he 
proposed that the “stylistic matrix” of the national spirit was metaphorically cap-
tured by the word plai, the image of a rolling alternation of hills and valleys, which 
embodied Romanians’ vacillation between and harmonization of, extremes. A simi-
lar alchemy of the national soul was conjured a few years later by philosopher 
Mircea Vulcănescu, who dwells on a word like întotdeauna (meaning "always", but 
literally reading "in-all-as-one"), which he claims is related to the Greek en kai pan, 
in order to illustrate the harmonious quality of the Romanian soul. Another interwar 
young philosopher who took up Blaga’s model was Constantin Noica, who, espe-
cially in his later works Rostirea filozofică românească (1970), Creație și frumos în 
rostirea românească (1973), and Cuvînt împreună despre rostirea românească 
(1987), picked out exemplary words like întru (“towards” and “[with]in”), rost 
(“purpose”, “order”, “meaning”, “speech”) or fire (“nature” or “character”) to illus-
trate the metaphysical depth of the national spirit. At the time, Noica was also feel-
ing his national identity under siege from both Soviet and capitalist modernization 
and thus resorted to the rhetorical strategy of metaphoric recoil from a confronta-
tional world. His lyricization of philosophical nationalism is a defensive strategy 
whereby he hoped to harmoniously resolve the stressful relations with communism 
and cultural alterities. In a cruel historical twist, the national-communist propaganda 
cunningly leeched off the very discourse of metaphoric nationalism and worked its 
parasitical way into the traditional emblems of the nation: the family (the mother 
country and her sons, the paternal figure of the leader), the language which encapsu-
lates the spirit of the nation, the country’s symbolic geography which harmonizes 
different climates and relief forms, etc.  
On occasion, the metaphoric nationalist discourse crosses into the early post-
communist years. Noica’s disciple, Gabriel Liiceanu, evoked in lyrical-symbolic 
terms the portrait of King Michael, deposed by the communist regime in 1947, on 
his first brief return to Romania in 1992. In a short if emotionally intense essay, De 
ce regi? (“Wherefore Kings?”), Liiceanu writes that:  
The King is the head of an entire people turned towards the sky, our whole 
being brought together at an elevated point. When a people is deprived of 
its rightful sovereign, it is bereft of its head turned towards heavens. (1992) 
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4. Antinomic Indexicality. Imagining the Nation by Irony
Irony is the second counter-intuitive master trope through which nationalist dis-
course can construct its cultural deixis. As an indexical device, irony proves just as 
confounding as metaphor as it plays cultural self against its alter only to tease us 
with their paradoxical identity (coincidentia oppositorum). In order to understand its 
non-conflictual potential, irony must be distinguished from sarcasm and mockery, 
which are forms of rhetorical violence more suited to the quarrelsome antithetical 
nationalism. By contrast, irony is a species of equivocation, whereby the contradic-
tory, paradoxical nature of a situation is articulated through a plurivocal, multiper-
spectival discourse which is “dialogic” in both a Socratic and a Bakhtinian sense. 
Both Hayden White (1973, p. 37) and Linda Hutcheon (1995, p. 11 and passim) 
caution us against taking irony to be the devious replacement of one meaning by 
another, and encourage us instead to see in it the coexistence of conflicting or in-
compatible meanings, of irreconcilable perspectives in one and the same discursive 
formula. Claire Colebrook also offers an eloquent argument for distinguishing be-
tween the inherent ambiguity of philosophical irony and the banal form of sarcastic 
univocality: 
Already, then, there is a difference between Socratic irony in the Platonic 
dialogues and a merely rhetorical irony. We can imagine a banal everyday 
irony where we said to a driver who turned out in front of us: ‘Well, that 
was clever!’ where clever clearly means stupid or unthinking. We are sub-
stituting one word for another, its opposite or contrary. But Socrates’ irony 
is not just a substitute of one word for another. Even at its clearest, he uses 
irony, not to say something else or opposite, but to question the use of a 
concept. He does not necessarily offer another or clearly recognisable op-
posed meaning. (2004, p. 25)  
Irony is a profoundly paradoxical or “aporetic”, dialectical mode by which the 
contraries of an antithesis become coincidental without conciliation. Kenneth Burke 
describes irony as a superior form of self-knowledge that assists the dialectical un-
derstanding of history as a relationship between self and other:  
True irony, however, irony that really does justify the attribute of “humili-
ty,” is not “superior” to the enemy…True irony, humble irony, is based up-
on a sense of fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him, is in-
debted to him, is not merely outside him as an observer but contains him 
within being consubstantial with him. (1969, p. 514) 
The rhetorical function of this antinomic nationalism is to vex everybody out of 
their dogmatic certainties with the troubling notion of a coincidence between nation-
al self and cultural other. Ironic nationalism wields paradoxes, oxymorons, and wit-
ticism in order to force the more hasty and self-assured nationalists to meditate on 
their superficial or inadequate dismissal of alterity. Its appeal is to the profound self-
probing of the nous by aporetic (aporetikós) arguments and dilemmas in order to 
elicit the problematizing and the self-questioning (rogare) of one’s national identity. 
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This produces parodic dramatizations of self/other encounters, shocking reversals, 
and unexpected twists, it diffuses the nationalist tension with a quick humor that is 
reminiscent of the ancient paradoxi and eiron-like characters or with the impenetra-
bility of oracular and esoteric dicta (Ștefănescu, 2013c, p. 138-46, 162-4). 
Irony can be another defensive strategy in the face of a daunting antagonist 
which it aims to disarm without direct opposition. Through an unexpected course of 
action or attitude, the opposite of what common sense dictates, one nevertheless 
procures the desired result. It is not surprising that historians of a nation which was 
for so long besieged by various indomitable empires and aggressors developed an 
ironic perspective on the inexplicable success of this nation to survive in spite of 
centuries of military assaults. Vlad Georgescu suggests there is a so-called “theory 
of capitulations” in Romanian historiography which claims that Romanian voivodes 
and boyars allegedly chose to ensure the survival and relative autonomy of their 
principalities precisely by accepting or even volunteering vassality to the Ottoman 
Porte, rather than by trying to directly confront it (qtd. in Caragea, 2004, p. 19 and 
passim). The stratagem was to identify the auspicious moments when the enemy felt 
less secure and to propose an advantageous conditional capitulation to the relieved 
aggressor. Evacuation was another perplexing strategy of Romanian resistance 
against sweeping migrations and empires. It amounted to scorching the lands and the 
crops, poisoning the wells and the springs, burning down the homesteads, and re-
treating into the central region of mountains and forests to discourage the advancing 
enemies who came to realize there was nothing to be gained from a now desolate 
territory. In short, one secured a psychological victory by battering oneself. Later on, 
in the years that followed the end of WWII, anticommunist resistance fighters would 
employ this strategy of using the woody mountains for a guerilla fight which sur-
prisingly lasted until the mid-1960s. When even that became impossible, certain 
members of the intellectual elites switched to a less heroic, yet equally surreptitious 
defense whereby they indirectly and covertly opposed communist tyranny by with-
drawing into the immaterial life of uncontaminated spiritual and aesthetic values.  
Letiția Guran has scanned this phenomenon known in Eastern Europe as the “re-
sistance through aesthetics/(high) culture” which, if we are to take the word of im-
portant public intellectuals like V. Havel or A. Michnik, represented an alternative 
or counter-discourse to communist propaganda (Guran, 2010, p. 55-60 and passim; 
cf. also Marino, 1996, and Martin, 2002). This “utopian” resistance was built on the 
ironic gesture of seemingly conceding victory to the communist oppressor while in 
fact insidiously undermining the process of indoctrination and destruction of cultural 
traditions. According to Guran, whose view I endorse, Constantin Noica best epito-
mized in communist Romania this philosophy of withdrawing from history and into 
the world of classical, eternal values. Noica, who became a widely respected public 
intellectual while never abandoning his life as a self-marginalized recluse, was a 
master of devious and ironic resistance by converting his palpable defeats into spir-
itual victories (Guran, 2010, p. 67-9, Ștefănescu, 2013b, p. 11-9). His provincial 
abode, a place of self-exile, became an alternative cultural center, a lay, non-
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communist Mecca of philosophy for aspiring intellectuals. Noica wrote compulsive-
ly on Romanianness as he suffered a double cultural trauma from both communist 
alienation and lack of recognition from a West which he felt equally kindred to and 
neglected by—a “disregarded brother” (1993, p. 10). Though indebted to the meta-
phoric nationalist idioms of Blaga and Vulcănescu, Noica’s treatment of language as 
a symbol of the nation was more than once modulated by the master trope of irony. 
In the context of Romania’s cultural war against Hungarian historiography over the 
right to and precedence in, Transylvania (Boia, 2010, p. 257), Noica chose to discuss 
the word hotar (“border”) in an unexpected manner: 
This word, hotar, so encoded into our language, is nevertheless taken from 
another language, Hungarian. Today, when we are already settled in the La-
tinity of our language, since no one is left to deny it, we should admit - 
whatever our past - to a good mental and affective contact with cohabiting 
nationalities.    
It is only fitting to tell and show them [i.e., the Hungarians), with brotherly 
gratitude, what we have made of their words; which is something entirely 
different at times. With hotar our speculations were so profound that we 
can now try to distinguish and separate the devil’s part in things from that 
of man. (1996, p. 206) 
The statement is ironic on multiple planes. Hinting at a delicate territorial con-
troversy with neighboring Hungary, now a communist sister nation, Noica picks up 
the word for territorial separation and reverses it into a symbol of spiritual commun-
ion, a coincidentia oppositorum of cultural self and arch-inimical other. National 
identity emerges mysteriously from this contradictory identification—an easily rec-
ognizable Hegelian dialectic. The tension is not dissipated—it is incorporated. The 
text still preserves the strain of the traditional ethnic differend (“whatever our past”) 
and Noica reiterates it just as he pretends to leave it behind, when he rather esoteri-
cally mentions the devil and speaks of the conceptual and moral borderlines, or 
when he indirectly suggests that Romanians made better use of the term than Hun-
garians themselves. Still, the typical frustration of a Romanian in front of a one-time 
imperial culture and a more refined civilization is resolved not by flaunting ethnic 
purity or earlier ancestry, but, shockingly, by accepting the cultural mestizaje and 
embracing linguistic otherness. 
Ironic images of the nation, which generate critical distance from imagological 
stereotypes, have a rather lengthy tradition that goes back to the first half of the 
nineteenth century in Romania (Drace-Francis, 2013, p. 117, 129-30). However, 
they are rather sparse in recent history, especially after 1989, when the reconstruc-
tion of national identity, a pressing and troubling matter, was debated mostly with 
antagonistic inflammation. Perhaps the one voice that merits a special mention is the 
late Luca Pițu, a master of postmodern witz, whose parodic idiom deconstructs na-
tionalist hagiography. His tactic resides in the ironic undermining of Romanian 
exceptionalism whose topoi Pițu enjoys to push to their absurd conclusions. He 
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subverts the self-congratulatory cliché regarding the matrix-space of Romanian 
identity (Blaga’s “spaţiul mioritic”, which I have addressed in the section on meta-
phoric nationalism) and reinscribes it as “spaţiul miosecuritic”, a portmanteau word 
combining the name of a revered Romanian mythical ballad, Miorița and Securitate, 
the dreaded name of the communist secret police. Pițu is similarly irreverent to geo-
cultural symbols: the Prut (a river that was the border between Romania and the 
USSR, dividing the country from an amputated and much lamented portion of Mol-
dova, now a separate state) is renamed “rîul pruturos” (from puturos, meaning 
“stinking”) and the Danube Delta is referred to as the cunnus et culus Europae, i.e., 
“Europe’s cone and ass” (1995, p. 142). In his letter to an occidental friend, an 
imagological reference to Malraux’s La tentation de l'occident and to the exchange 
of letters between Noica and Cioran, Pițu claims to belong to l’ubunivers dadan-
ubien (1995, p. 206). His ironic discourse on the nation invites the readers to con-
stantly rethink their identitarian certainty and pride. 
Behind the subtleties and witticism in Noica’s or Pițu’s ironic images of the na-
tion, one senses the bitterness of a thwarted identity, the unmistakable signs of cul-
tural trauma. Ironic nationalism in postcommunist countries like Romania is never a 
relaxed meditation on the complexities of national identity, but rather a strategy of 
distress, a compensating move in the face of historical duress. 
Concluding remarks: reassessing nationalism’s potential for conflict 
A nation’s identity is a plurivalent and unsettled indexical relation between sev-
eral images of the collective self and of cultural others. In the case of insecure na-
tions that struggle to emerge from cultural traumas it becomes even clearer that the 
national self is caught in an inevitably unstable cultural deixis. My purpose here has 
been to illustrate this versatility of nationalist discourse as it is inflected by the four 
indexical master tropes which prefigure cultural representations of self and other, as 
well as to suggest the unequal potential for conflict of these four different versions 
of national identity. Although the examples I have provided here for the four discur-
sive templates and for their genealogy come from the modern and recent history of 
Romania, I am confident that this explanatory scheme works for other postcom-
munist European cultures with a history of identity trauma. Naturally, in these other 
East European contexts, the frequency and dominance of each master trope in the 
competing versions of national (re)construction will vary according to the particulars 
of each country’s historical situation.  
I have suggested four discursive principles that organize a nation’s cultural deix-
is: on the one hand, there are the intuitive master tropes of antithesis and simile (a 
choice that is corroborated by the analytical categories proposed by François Hartog 
or Ruth Wodak et al.), on the other, there are the counterintuitive master tropes of 
metaphor and irony, already suggested by Kenneth Burke and Hayden White. Of the 
four, antithesis is the only one with an overt potential for conflict which comes from 
the antagonistic structure of representations of the nation as an inverted image of its 
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cultural other(s). Unfortunately, this is the most frequented mode of conceiving 
one’s national identity, which explains why critics of nationalism have a tendency to 
reduce all the different forms  nationalism to this type of exclusionary discourse, 
especially in its most exaggerated forms. It is true that, in certain critical situations 
or in circumstances were patriotic passions get out of hand, it is rather easy to cross 
the line into excessive or extremist forms of nationalism or even past those, into 
chauvinism, racism, and xenophobia. But it does not follow with necessity that anti-
thetical nationalism’s potential for conflict will lead to symbolic or physical vio-
lence, just as, for instance, oppositions of temperament or in intellectual and sport-
ing competitions do not, of their own nature, translate into verbal or physical abuse. 
The most common varieties of antithetical nationalism exacerbate differences in 
order to singularize the nation, to provide exceptionalist descriptions of one’s nation 
and of its supposed mission. In traumatized cultures like Romania, however, one 
notices an inflation of reverse exceptionalism and self-loathing/self-hatred whereby 
the nation is singled out by its negative traits or by its unparalleled catastrophic fate 
and consummate lack of success. 
What is notable—and yet remains largely unnoticed—is that all other master 
tropes employed in the discursive construction of national identity are less prone to 
conflictual representations of the nation, if at all. Simile minimizes irreconcilable 
differences and insists on what the nation shares in common with other cultures as 
members of a super-ingroup or a higher-level community (e.g., Europeanness, 
Christianity etc.). Although Christian brotherhood was commonly invoked to the 
Western courts by Romanian princes in their joint fight against the Ottoman threat, it 
was especially in the wake of the Enlightenment that modernizing cultural elites in 
Romania became particularly amenable to such analogical portraits of the country 
which focused on affinities with the rest of the civilized (Western) world. As an 
indexical master trope for national self-imaging, metaphor also obnubilates or as-
similates beyond recognition cultural alterities by a process of identity harmoniza-
tion, wherein a symbolic part of the nation contains the whole and enables the genial 
integration of otherness or blending into the universe as a whole. In such a lyrical 
and empathetic mode, difference and alterity all but cease being represented to the 
mind and conflict is almost entirely absent. Irony is yet another form of cultural 
deixis in nationalist discourse which curbs the confrontational furor we tend to asso-
ciate with nationalism. By presenting the self-other relation in a paradoxical or apo-
retic manner, the counterintuitive master trope of irony thwarts any war-like inclina-
tions as it vexingly suggests that, in their very opposition—indeed, even by virtue of 
that opposition—self and other are a contradictory and inseparable whole, and that 
the adversarial other is not an enemy to be suppressed but an essential and beneficial 
contributor to the growth and well-being of the national self. The aim of ironic dis-
course on the nation’s identity is to challenge the wit in order to constantly rethink 
the dialectical relation between national self and otherness. A classic, the technique 
of the weaker eiron outwitting the martial but unsuspecting alazon becomes particu-
larly handy for subaltern, marginalized cultures that have been predilect victims of 
historical trauma at the hands of imperial or colonial powers. 
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This manifold picture of nationalist discourse in modern and recent Romanian 
history indicates a cultural dispute between four competing discourses on the 
(re)construction of the nation. These different discursive templates of nationalism 
become predominant to various degrees and in various social contexts or quarters 
through sustained processes of enculturation. Such processes involve canonical 
reinforcement through formal and informal institutions until any of these versions of 
the nation is embraced by larger groups of national subjects. Resting on the theoreti-
cal grounds of Norman Fairclough and other critical discourse analysts, Michał 
Krzyżanowski and Aleksandra Galasińska have also concluded that social 
(re)construction in critical or traumatic historical contexts such as postcommunist 
Europe is effected through the public interaction and “operationalization” of multi-
ple identity-forging discourses: 
Particularly in contexts of crisis and instability, groups of social agents and 
agencies seem to develop diverse and competing strategies for change, and 
successful strategies are implemented and can lead to structural change. But 
from a cultural political economy perspective, strategies are partly consti-
tuted as discourses which map accounts of the past and the present and their 
problems and failures onto ‘imaginaries’ for the future. Where strategies are 
successful, their implementation entails dialectical relations and transfor-
mations between discourses and other moments of the social: the operation-
alisation of discourses and narratives in wider social and material changes, 
their enactment in new practices, institutions, organisational routines and so 
on, their inculcation in new identities, and their materialisation in changes 
in the physical world. (2009, p. 26) 
In the face of the obvious predominance of antithetical nationalism, the more 
conflictual of the four possible discourses on national identity, whose exaggeration 
has often been led to physical or symbolic conflicts, it appears that the frequency 
and magnitude of such conflicts may be minimized by a steady and widespread 
counter-enculturation of alternative nationalist discourses through public institutions 
and practices like the education system, the media, public and political campaigning 
etc. We would do well to promote the other three less or non-conflictual versions of 
nationalism in the public space. Inculcating them in social consciousness would 
encourage a more open and relaxed attitude towards nationalism and ethno-cultural 
identity. The increased presence of such alternative nationalist discourses might help 
disperse the reserve or repulsiveness with which nationalism is met by its usual 
critics who reduce it to exclusionary and intolerant attitudes. As one astute scholar 
of discursive violence has put it: “[c]onflict resolution is thus a recognition of the 
multiple and shifting identities of individuals all of which constitute the basis of 
communicative interaction” (Jabri, 1996, p. 119-20). Rather than hold anyone ac-
countable for their legitimate desire to cultivate a sense of national belonging—
which some critics of nationalism do out of a misconceived fear that this will auto-
matically lead to ethnic or cultural wars—, we should encourage the non-conflictual 
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discourses of analogical, metaphoric, and ironic nationalism to become more vigor-
ous canonical alternatives to the routine antagonistic representations of the nation.  
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